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ABSTRACT
Quebec, the only province within Canada to follow the civil law
tradition, is an ideal microcosm for the study of unity and diversity
within legal orders. The question of whether Quebec’s civilian legal
tradition should be interpreted and applied so as to be in unity with
the common law or, rather, adhere to its own distinct legal culture
has pervaded doctrine and jurisprudence for over a century. Interestingly, the pendulum has swung widely. Quebec has seen moments
when the philosophy of the Supreme Court of Canada was one of
unification and harmonization of Quebec law with the common law
tradition, as well as moments when it advanced staunch diversity.
The situation today is more nuanced. Quebec’s civilian tradition
has undoubtedly survived as a distinct legal order within Canada
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due to legal interpretation but also interdisciplinary factors, including language and politics. Even within areas borrowed through legal transplantation from the common law, Quebec maintains a distinct civilian methodology and interpretation and the Supreme
Court has held that Canada’s legal traditions should continue to
evolve side by side, each maintaining its distinctive character. Diversity, however, has been recently tempered by a growth in comparative law as between Canada’s legal traditions. Increasingly, the
Supreme Court is looking to Quebec civil law in appeals from common law provinces and Quebec continues to look to the common law
in many areas. However, far from leading to unity, comparative law
in Canada has been used as a tool for information, education and,
most importantly, inspiration.
Keywords: comparative law, legal traditions, mixed jurisdictions,
judicial methodology
I. INTRODUCTION
Quebec, the only province within Canada to follow the civil law
tradition, is an ideal microcosm for the study of unity and diversity
within legal orders. Canada is a bijural country because of the presence of the French civil law tradition, which applies in private law
matters in Quebec, and the English common law tradition characteristic of the rest of Canada. 1 For over a century, jurists have debated
the status of the civil law tradition within the common law nation
and have questioned how, and sometimes whether, the two traditions can co-exist. This article will examine three general trends that
have emerged in response to this debate; three different ways to imagine the relationship between Quebec’s civilian tradition and the
broader Canadian common law legal system. These trends reflect
the philosophies of unification, diversification and, more recently,
of inspiration and cross-fertilization of ideas between these two traditions.

1. Canada has more than the two legal traditions of the civil and the common
law. In particular, it also has indigenous legal traditions. However, the focus of
this paper will be on the relationship between the civil and common law traditions.
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Over Canada’s 150-year history, the pendulum has swung
widely between unification and diversification. Towards the end of
the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of Canada was largely
motivated by a philosophy of unification, which had the effect of
making Quebec civil law more compatible with the common law.2
However, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century,
prominent Quebec jurists began to reject this approach and to advance instead a philosophy of staunch diversification emphasizing
the civilian tradition’s distinctiveness from the common law. 3 The
situation today is more nuanced. While Quebec’s civilian tradition
has undoubtedly survived as a distinct legal order within Canada,
the emphasis on diversity has recently been tempered by a growth
in comparative law between Canada’s legal traditions. In recent
years, we have seen the Supreme Court of Canada increasingly look
to Quebec civil law in appeals from common law provinces, and to
the common law in appeals from Quebec, embracing the concept of
learning from the other. 4 This does not, however, imply a return to
earlier attempts to harmonize or unify Canadian civil and common
law traditions. Rather, it represents an emergent trend, one of inspiration, in which courts use comparative law as a tool for information
and education, as a positive influence in the development of each
distinct legal tradition.
By focusing on these three trends, this article will examine the
dialectic and changing relationship between Quebec civil law and
2. David Howes, From Polyjurality to Monojurality: The Transformation of
Quebec Law, 1875-1929, 32 MCGILL L.J. 523, 526 (1986-1987). See also Charles
D. Gonthier, Some Comments on the Common Law and the Civil Law in Canada:
Influences, Parallel Developments and Borrowings, 21 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 323,
326 (1992-1993).
3. Sylvio Normand, Un thème dominant de la pensée juridique traditionnelle au Québec : La sauvegarde de l’intégrité du droit civil, 32 MCGILL L.J. 559,
564 (1986-1987).
4. This trend, while not as pronounced, can be found in lower court decisions as well. See, e.g., Opron Construction Co. v. Alberta (1994) 151 A.R. 241
(Can. Alta. Q.B.) (an Alberta common law case citing Quebec law on duty to
disclose) [hereinafter Opron Construction Co.]; and Churchill Falls (Labrador)
Corporation Ltd. v. Hydro-Québec, 2016 QCCA 1229 (Can. Que.) (a Quebec
Court of Appeal decision citing the common law on good faith).
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Canadian common law. Many protagonists have helped shape this
relationship, from the early Supreme Court justices Henri-Elzéar
Taschereau and Pierre-Basile Mignault, to Justice Louis LeBel, who
served on the same Court roughly one century later. Their voices are
crucial in understanding the philosophies they helped develop. Before examining these figures and these ideological movements,
however, it is important to explain Quebec’s position as a mixed
jurisdiction and the only Canadian province with a civilian legal tradition.
II. QUEBEC AND THE CANADIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Quebec enjoys a unique legal position in Canada, which stems
from its history as having been a French colony before becoming a
British one. Quebec passed from French to British control after the
English conquest in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759,
affirmed by the Treaty of Paris of 1763. 5 However, a seminal moment in Canadian legal history occurred a decade later, in 1774,
when the British Parliament enacted the Quebec Act. 6 This Act was
aimed largely at appeasing the colony’s French-Canadian population by guaranteeing them the continued use of the French language,
the maintenance of their Catholic religion, and the application of
French law in private matters. Public law, however, remained governed by the English common law system. In this way, two legal
systems found their home in Quebec.
This bijurality was preserved in the British North America Act
(today, the Constitution Act), which established Canada as a Confederation in 1867. The Canadian Constitution divided powers between the federal and provincial governments, leaving provinces the

5. The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship (The Treaty of Paris), Feb.
10, 1763, 15 R.A.T.F. 66.
6. The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, § VII (U.K.).
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control over many areas of private law, such as contracts, extra-contractual responsibility (torts), property, successions, and procedure. 7
Accordingly, in Quebec, these aspects of private law continued to
be regulated by a codified civilian legal tradition. 8 Areas of law falling under federal jurisdiction, such as criminal law, banking, and
bankruptcy, became regulated uniformly by the federal government
under a common law framework. 9 As such, Quebec is a mixed jurisdiction that maintains its historically unique position within Canada as the only one of ten provinces and three territories to follow
both civilian and common law traditions.
Quebec is a mixed jurisdiction in other respects as well. As judicial institutions are uniform across Canada, Quebec courts, like
those of other provinces, are modeled on the English system and are
courts of inherent jurisdiction. 10 There is one final appellate court in
the country, the Supreme Court of Canada, which reviews all matters of Canadian law: private, public, provincial, federal, civil law
and common law. Three out of the nine Supreme Court judges must
come from Quebec. 11 Moreover, while Quebec judges apply substantive civil law to private matters, they are similar, in style, to their
common law counterparts in many ways. They are nominated from
the Bar as opposed to educated in an École de la Magistrature. Their
decisions are written in a similar manner to English common law
judgments in the sense that they are discursive and personalized, include dissents, and refer to precedent, although Quebec does not adhere to a formal system of stare decisis. 12 Finally, while procedural
7. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, §§ 92(13) to 92(14) (U.K.),
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, No. 5 (Can.) [hereinafter Constitution Act,
1867].
8. Quebec has both a Civil Code, the first version of which came into force
in 1866, and a Code of Civil Procedure, which first came into effect in 1867.
9. See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 7, §§ 91(15), 91(21), 91(26).
10. Hétu v. Notre-Dame-de-Lourdes (Municipalité de), 2005 QCCA 199, paras. 35-47 (Can. Que.); I.H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 23
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 23, 23 (1970).
11. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, §§ 3, 6 (Can.).
12. Rosalie Jukier, Inside the Judicial Mind: Exploring Judicial Methodology
in the Mixed Legal System of Quebec, 6 J. COMP. L. 54, 59 (2011).
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law in Quebec is codified and thus in a civilian format, its content is
largely inspired by the common law adversarial process, as opposed
to the continental inquisitorial one, and it is focused on oral advocacy and driven by common law rules of evidence and procedure. 13
III. THE UNIFICATION MODEL
While the federal division of powers in the Constitution has allowed Quebec to maintain its civilian tradition in private law, it was
not always clear that this tradition would survive as an autonomous
legal order in an otherwise common law country. In the decades following Canada’s creation in 1867, there was a distinct trend on the
Supreme Court of Canada that favoured standardizing Canadian
law, accomplished largely by imposing common law solutions onto
Quebec civil law issues. 14 While this trend was based on a philosophy of harmonizing the law across Canada, it unfolded in a markedly
non-reciprocal way and ultimately became a project of making the
civil law compatible with the common law and not vice versa. Had
this trend continued, it is possible that the civilian tradition of Quebec would have lost its distinctive character entirely or, at the very
least, would not be the robust legal tradition it has become today.

13. Id. at 63. For example, Quebec procedure includes pre-trial discovery and
the class action, both quintessential common law elements of procedural law.
However, recent revisions to procedural law have significantly broadened judges’
powers of case management and have moved Quebec procedure somewhat closer
to a judge-centered model. See also Rosalie Jukier, The Impact of Legal Traditions on Quebec Procedural Law: Lessons from Quebec’s New Code of Civil Procedure, 93 CANADIAN BAR REV. 1 (2015).
14. See, e.g., Magann v. Auger (1901), 31 S.C.R. 186 (Can.) [hereinafter
Magann v. Auger]; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson (1887), 14 S.C.R. 105
(Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.]. Note that this case came before the
Supreme Court again in 1891, in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Robinson,
[1891] 19 S.C.R. 292, and that this second decision was overturned by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Robinson v. The Canadian Pacific Railway
(Canada), [1892] UKPC 37 (U.K.). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in the United Kingdom continued to review appeals from the Supreme Court of
Canada until 1949. The Canadian Pacific Railway decision referenced in this article is the one decided by the Supreme Court in 1887. See also Jean-Louis Baudouin, L’interprétation du Code Civil Québécois par la Cour Suprême du Canada, 53 CANADIAN BAR REV. 715 (1975).
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This philosophy of unification was prevalent in the “Taschereau
years” of the Canadian Supreme Court. Sir Henri-Elzéar Taschereau
was appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court in 1878, just three
years after its creation, and served until 1906, the last four of those
years as chief justice. Taschereau believed in standardizing and unifying the laws across Canada, and saw the Court as the instrument
of bringing the civil and common law in line with each other. 15
Taschereau argued in favour of unification for two reasons. First, he
thought it was illogical to have contradictory answers to the same
legal questions depending on the region of Canada in which a case
arose. For instance, in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson,
Taschereau, writing for the majority, interpreted an article of the
Civil Code of Lower Canada, the primary source for Quebec’s civil
law at the time, on the premise that it should be consistent with the
rest of Canadian law. 16 In that case, Taschereau held that it would
be contrary to the legislative intent behind the Civil Code that a
widow should be compensated in damages for her husband’s death
in Lower Canada (Quebec) when such compensation did not lie in
Upper Canada (Ontario). To interpret the article differently would
be to suggest that the legislator intended for such disparity whereas
Taschereau believed the intention was, instead, to “put the law in
both Provinces on the same footing.” 17 He reasoned that, “a statute
would not be held to mean one thing in England and another in Scotland. And so here, I take it, it cannot mean in Lower Canada what it
does not mean in Upper Canada, or give a larger remedy in one
Province than in the other.” 18 In short, he interpreted the codal article in such a way as to render it consistent with the common law
applicable in the rest of Canada.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Howes, supra note 2, at 525-526.
Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14, at 124.
Id.
Id. at 125.
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The second reason behind Taschereau’s philosophy of unification was that he believed it preferable to base arguments and decisions on any legal source that provided reasonable guiding principles, rather than to adhere exclusively to the sources of a particular
legal tradition. He was open to looking beyond the Civil Code of
Lower Canada and to using alternative sources to inform his civil
law decisions including Roman law, sources from other countries
and, most particularly, common law precedent. 19 This approach is
visible in Magann v. Auger, a case concerning contract formation by
post. Here, Taschereau examined a multitude of sources including
the approach to the same legal problem in France, a variety of doctrinal writings, and the Civil Code. Ultimately, however, he based
his decision on common law precedent, concluding that, “we declare
the law to be in the Province of Quebec upon the same footing as it
stands in England, and in the rest of the Dominion.” 20 In so doing,
Taschereau indicated that sources like common law precedent could
be brought in and prioritized over sources from the civilian tradition
if they seemed more appropriate in any given situation. Unlike later
jurists, he did not see the civil law as a distinct tradition that should
be informed exclusively by its own particular sources. Rather, he
believed the use of any source could be valid if it brought about a
reasonable outcome. To Taschereau, that often meant a unified outcome across Canada.
In the decades following Justice Taschereau’s tenure on the
Court, many Quebec jurists voiced opposition to this unifying approach, arguing that it threatened and undermined the civil law tradition. Critics went so far as to argue that the civilian tradition might
cease to exist if the pattern were to continue. 21 A modern lens on
Taschereau’s approach, however, has shed a more positive light on
his philosophy. David Howes has characterized Taschereau’s willingness to look across traditions as a form of “polyjurality” and has
19. Howes, supra note 2, at 542.
20. Magann v. Auger, supra note 14, at 193.
21. Howes, supra note 2, at 551. Normand, supra note 3, at 578-579.
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lauded his attempt to develop pan-Canadian legal principles. 22 From
this vantage point, Taschereau sought “universally admitted rules of
law” by looking to every available legal source, rather than narrowing his vision and working within one tradition to the exclusion of
others. 23 Moreover, although Taschereau clearly favoured harmonization of Canadian law, he did not undertake this unification project
in a conscious attempt to undermine the civilian tradition. 24 While
he was not a militant protector of the civil law, he nonetheless considered elements of it in his decisions and, on occasion, attempted
to bring civilian principles into common law judgments. 25
However, regardless of Taschereau’s motives, unification was
not, in practice, a reciprocal process. The philosophy of harmonizing
the laws of Canada was frequently used to bring common law principles into civil law cases, but never actually resulted in bringing
civil law principles into common law ones. 26 Gaps in the civil law
were filled by importing common law ideas rather than by interpreting civilian sources, such as the Civil Code, or by looking to French
law, while the common law remained distinctive and was developed
with exclusive reference to its own sources and concepts. This unification philosophy left little autonomy for the application of a distinct civilian tradition, and the approach eventually gave rise to a
fear that the civil law was under threat of extinction. 27 Not surprisingly, this period was followed by one in which the pendulum swung
to the other extreme and jurists adopted an opposing diversification
22. Howes, supra note 2, at 525-527.
23. Id. at 525, 558.
24. For instance, in 1882, Taschereau wrote to the Prime Minister suggesting
that appeals from Quebec should only be heard by the Supreme Court in cases
touching on criminal, constitutional, and electoral matters, that is, that the Supreme Court should avoid judging private law cases from Quebec entirely. This
suggestion was based on the idea that a majority common-law court was not ideally suited to judge civilian cases. See JAMES G. SNELL & FREDERICK VAUGHAN,
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTION 30, 47 (U. of
Toronto Press 1985).
25. Id. at 130. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Horn (1882), 7 S.C.R. 409 (Can.)
(Taschereau, J., dissenting).
26. Baudouin, supra note 14, at 719.
27. Normand, supra note 3, at 578.
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approach, arguing that the civil law tradition was unique and distinct, and should not be informed by anything other than civilian
sources.
IV. THE DIVERSIFICATION MODEL
The movement away from the model of unification to one of diversification and legal autonomy for the civil law tradition is largely
attributable to Justice Pierre-Basile Mignault, who served on the Canadian Supreme Court from 1918 to 1929. Mignault fervently believed that the civil law was part of Quebec’s ancestral heritage and
had to be protected at all costs. 28 Worried about the survival of the
civilian tradition in Canada, Mignault emphasized the distinctiveness of the civil law and argued that it needed to be developed autonomously from common law influences in order to preserve its
identity, originality, and integrity. 29
In his decisions, Mignault emphasized the differences between
Quebec’s laws and those of the rest of Canada, focusing more on
what was unique about the civil law as opposed to Taschereau’s approach, which focused on what was universal and shared with the
common law. 30 Since the two systems were so distinct, Mignault
argued, using one to inform the other was unnecessary and would
only render each system less pure and coherent. The civil law, he
maintained, was an internally strong and fertile system and there
was thus no need to borrow concepts from the common law in order

28. Pierre-Basile Mignault, L’avenir de notre droit civil, 1 REVUE DU DROIT
104, 116 (1922).
29. See, e.g., The Mile End Milling Co. v. Peterborough Cereal Co., [1924]
S.C.R. 120 (Can.) [hereinafter The Mile End Milling Co.]; Colonial Real Estate
Co. v. La Communauté des Sœurs de la Charité de l'Hôpital Général de Montréal
(1918), 57 S.C.R. 585 (Can.) [hereinafter Colonial Real Estate Co.]; Magann v.
Auger, supra note 14, at 193; Mignault, supra note 28. Mignault was not the only
Supreme Court Justice who used this approach. Justice Brodeur, for instance,
serving on the Court from 1911 to 1923, was also “vigilant on behalf of the civillaw tradition” in his decisions. See SNELL & VAUGHAN, supra note 24, at 130.
30. Jean-Gabriel Castel, Le juge Mignault défenseur de l'intégrité du droit
civil québécois, 53 CANADIAN BAR REV. 544, 545-549 (1975).
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to answer civilian legal questions or develop principles. 31 Instead,
answers could be found within the civil law tradition, most notably,
in the Civil Code, which Mignault believed to be internally consistent and rational, as well as in doctrinal interpretations of codal
articles. 32
Mignault believed that it was not only unnecessary but, indeed,
undesirable to import common law principles into the civil law since
doing so weakened the civilian tradition as a whole. Transplanting
common law ideas into the civilian legal framework risked the introduction of concepts that conflicted with existing civil law rules,
causing contradictions and detracting from the system’s integrity,
making an otherwise rational system impure and illogical. 33 Moreover, he believed this endangered the tradition’s continued existence, warning that, “we should not forget the case of Louisiana.” 34
Mignault believed that Louisiana was losing its distinctive civilian
tradition and implied the same might happen in Quebec if this importation continued. As a result, Mignault was “of the opinion that
each system of law should be administered according to its own
rules and by reference to authorities or judgments which are binding

31. Pierre-Basile Mignault, Les rapports entre le droit civil et la common law
au Canada, spécialement dans la province de Québec, 11 REVUE DU DROIT 201,
205-206 (1932).
32. Castel, supra note 30, at 550-551. See also Regent Taxi & Transport Co.
v. La Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie, [1929] S.C.R. 650 (Can.) [hereinafter Regent Taxi]; Mignault, supra note 31, at 204-205; Pierre-Basile Mignault,
Le Code civil de la Province de Québec et son interprétation, 1 U. TORONTO L.J.
104, 129-139 (1935).
33. Castel, supra note 30, at 546. See, e.g., The Mile End Milling Co., supra
note 29, at 129, where Mignault criticized the respondents’ lawyers for citing
common law authorities stating that, “it is not in this way that we will conserve
Quebec civil law in all its integrity” (author’s translation) (“Ce n'est pas ainsi que
l'on conservera dans toute son intégrité le droit civil dans la province de Québec.”).
34. Mignault, supra note 28, at 116 (“N'oublions pas le cas de la Louisiane.”)
(author’s translation). Mignault was writing at a time when others were expressing
similar concerns in Louisiana itself. In his article, Mignault based his opinion on
a letter he received from a lawyer in Louisiana who explained that the common
law was becoming increasingly influential within the state. See also, e.g., Gordon
Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TULSA L. REV. 585, 596
(1937).
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on it alone.” 35 The difference between Mignault’s and Taschereau’s
approach is evident in Mignault’s dissenting opinion in Regent Taxi,
a case that dealt with the same two articles of the Civil Code that
Taschereau had interpreted earlier in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Robinson. 36 Where Taschereau’s interpretation was based on a philosophy of unifying different traditions, Mignault’s methodology
was completely different as it focused on reconciling the apparently
contradictory articles with one another, situating them within the rational framework of the Code. 37
Justice Mignault was not alone in this concern for the continued
viability of Quebec civil law. Sylvio Normand’s study on the editors
and authors of the Revue du Droit, a Quebec law journal published
from 1922 to 1939, indicates a similar apprehension among numerous Quebec jurists at the time. 38 One of the major themes discussed
in the Revue was the deep connection between Quebec’s heritage,
society, culture and its civil law tradition, and the sense that this tradition was under threat by common law influences. 39 Like Mignault,
participants in the Revue sought to protect Quebec’s civilian tradition by emphasizing its distinctiveness, discouraging the importation of common law principles, and developing legal concepts
through the exclusive use of civilian sources. David Howes has argued that this staunch diversity approach has its drawbacks since the
select use of such sources forces jurists into a narrow, text-focused
interpretation of the law and ignores the benefits of attaining global
consensus. 40 However, it is clear that this diversification trend dominated legal discourse in Quebec in the early twentieth century and
undoubtedly played a large role in preserving the heritage of the civil
law tradition in Canada.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Colonial Real Estate Co., supra note 29, at 603.
Regent Taxi, supra note 32; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14.
Regent Taxi, supra note 32, at 682-683.
Normand, supra note 3.
Id. at 562-564.
Howes, supra note 2, at 552-553.
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V. THE CONTEMPORARY POSITION
The unification trend of the Taschereau years and the diversification model that followed at the time of Mignault’s tenure on the
Supreme Court represent two opposing ends of the spectrum. However, neither movement is confined to one specific time in history
nor, indeed, to one jurist, and one can discern evidence of both
trends in Canada today.
The unification mentality, while largely replaced by one of diversification, can still be found in decisions rendered many decades
later, particularly in instances where the relevant legal concepts at
issue had been transplanted from the common law into the civil law.
For example, as recently as 1975, in a case emanating from Quebec
dealing with the remedy of specific performance, the Supreme Court
declared that, “the principles established in common law jurisdictions [must apply in Quebec] since this is a remedy taken from
them.” 41 Similarly, in a 2007 decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal dealing with judicial recusation, the Court condoned recourse
to Canadian and foreign precedent, even going so far as to state it
was incumbent to do so when Quebec law was silent on the subject,
on the ground that the principles in question in the common law
were similar to those in Quebec law. 42
Moreover, elements of the unification philosophy have recently
surfaced in cases where the Supreme Court has explicitly noted the
advantages of reconciling civil and common law principles. In a
very recent set of cases on appeal from Quebec, the Court has remarked that the “natural convergence in principles and outcomes

41. Trudel v. Clairol Inc. of Can., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 236, 246 (Can.). This is no
longer the interpretation given to the remedy of specific performance in Quebec
law. See Royal Bank of Canada v. Propriétés Cité Concordia Ltée, [1983] R.D.J.
524 (Can. Que. S.C.); Construction Belcourt Ltée v. Golden Griddle Pancake
House Ltd., [1988] R.J.Q. 716 (Can. Que. S.C.); Varnet Software Corp. v. Varnet
U.K. Ltd., [1994] R.J.Q. 2755, 2758 (Can. Que. C.A.).
42. Wightman v. Widdrington (Succession de), 2007 QCCA 1687, para. 58
(Can. Que.). See also Droit de la famille – 1559, [1993] R.J.Q. 625, para. 11 (Can.
Que. C.A.).
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[between the civil and common law] is generally desirable,” 43 and
that the approach it adopted in a particular case, “[had] the advantage of being compatible with the most recent developments in
the North American law . . . .” 44 In a parallel to Taschereau’s claim
regarding the consistency of damage awards across Canada in the
1887 case of Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson, the Court, in
2013, has even noted the advantages of assessing compensation for
bodily harm on a similar scale in Quebec as in common law Canada
on the premise that it “should not vary greatly from one part of the
country to another.” 45
On the other hand, the diversification model has also endured
and continued to develop well after Justice Mignault’s time on the
Supreme Court. In 2014, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed
this approach, writing that, “the common law and the civil law
[should] evolve side by side, while each maintains its distinctive
character.” 46 This model has even found a modern champion in Justice Louis LeBel, a judge of the Supreme Court from 2000 to 2014.
LeBel, like his forerunner, Mignault, continued to stress the importance of prioritizing civilian sources in civil law decisions, focusing particularly on the unique position of the Civil Code in Quebec law. Several of his judgments reaffirm that “the starting point is

43. Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC
55, para. 52 (Can.) [hereinafter Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc.].
44. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant v. Blouin, 2003 SCC 31,
para. 22 (Can.) [hereinafter Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant].
45. Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73, para. 85 (Can.); Canadian
Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14.
46. Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, para. 93
(Can.) [hereinafter Supreme Court Act, 2014]. This idea is also supported in the
Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, a statute aimed at making federal law
more compatible with the law of Quebec. The Act states:
Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada and,
unless otherwise provided by law, if in interpreting an enactment it is
necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming
part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the
rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the time the
enactment is being applied.
Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4, § 8.1 (Can.).
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not the common law but the Civil Code of Quebec, which is the
basic general law in Quebec, as provided for in the preliminary provision of the Civil Code,” 47 and that, “the Civil Code is the jus commune of Quebec.” 48
Like Mignault, LeBel has cautioned against the dangers of importing common law principles into the civilian tradition without a
careful consideration of how the principles in question would fit into
a civilian framework. 49 According to LeBel, “it would be extremely
unwise to import, holus bolus, legal concepts that were developed
in another system of law without first determining whether they are
compatible with the rules that apply to civil liability in Quebec.”50
He, too, believed that indiscriminate importation could cause contradictions and thus undermine the coherence of the civilian tradition. 51 Justice LeBel is not alone in expounding this idea. Caution
against wholesale importation of common law principles permeates
the discourse of civilian decisions penned by other Supreme Court
justices, as well as those rendered by lower courts in Quebec. 52

47. Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires
du Québec, 2004 SCC 53, para. 56 (Can.) [hereinafter Gilles E. Néron].
48. Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, para. 15 (Can.) [hereinafter
Doré v. Verdun].
49. Gilles E. Néron, supra note 47, para. 53 (“Courts should avoid needlessly
importing or applying common law rules in a matter which, subject to the principles of Charter law, is governed by the procedure, methods and principles of the
civil law.”).
50. Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, 2002 SCC 85, para. 54 (Can.).
51. Id. para. 58 and para. 63:
[T]he defence of qualified privilege cannot be incorporated in that form
into the civil law rules which are based on a presumption of good faith,
without disturbing the coherence of its application in the area of public
authority liability. . . . It is not only unjustified, but pointless, to import
that defence into the civil law.
52. For an example of a Supreme Court decision, see Farber v. Royal Trust
Co., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846, para. 30 (Gonthier, J.) (Can.) (“Caution must be exercised in adopting unreservedly common-law concepts of contract into cases arising under the Civil law, except where there is useful necessity and authoritative
precedent.”); for an example of a lower court decision, see Anglo Pacific Group
PLC v. Ernst & Young, Inc., [2013] R.J.Q. 1264, para. 36 (Can. Que. C.A.) (“The
civil law is a complete system and one must guard against adopting principles that
come from foreign legal systems without questioning their compatibility with our
law.”).
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Despite evidence of both philosophies in contemporary Canadian jurisprudence, the predominant trend is that of diversity. Without question, the civilian tradition has not only survived but has enjoyed a “renewal of [its] distinct legal culture.” 53 Moreover, while
the efforts of jurists such as Mignault and LeBel have been crucial
in maintaining the distinctiveness of the civil law tradition, one cannot ignore the social and political factors that have also contributed
to this outcome.
One reason that Quebec civil law has continued to remain distinct is that the civilian tradition in Quebec is inextricably linked to
the French language. William Tetley has argued that the linguistic
separation of traditions is one of the most important factors in keeping legal traditions in mixed jurisdictions distinct. 54 At the very
least, a different language serves to ensure that jurists are aware of
a tradition’s distinctiveness and separation from the other applicable
tradition in the same jurisdiction. This linguistic separation is somewhat nuanced in Canada since both linguistic versions of the Civil
Code are equally official, as are both English and French versions
of Supreme Court decisions. 55 However, Quebec civil law is linguistically delineated from Canadian common law in the sense that the
former is typically associated with the French language and the latter
with English. 56 While most Quebec jurists are bilingual, law is prac-

53. John E.C. Brierley, The Renewal of Quebec’s Distinct Legal Culture: The
New Civil Code of Québec, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 484 (1992).
54. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 676, 727-728 (2000).
55. Doré v. Verdun, supra note 48; Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 7, §
133 para. 2; Administration of the Court, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA,
https://perma.cc/LUV9-5JKH.
56. There are exceptions to this rule. McGill University in Quebec teaches
the Civil Law in English, while the University of Moncton in New Brunswick, as
well as the University of Ottawa in Ontario, teach the Common Law in French.
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ticed primarily in French in Quebec, and today the majority of judgments are rendered in French. 57 The bilingual nature of Quebec jurists also enables them to engage with civilian sources in either their
original French or English, particularly the French sources that inspired many principles in Quebec’s Civil Code. There exist, of
course, civil law jurisdictions in the world that are characterized by
the English language such as Scotland, Jersey, and Louisiana, where
even the Louisiana Civil Code is published in English only. 58 While
this is not fatal to the continued viability of these civilian traditions,
in addition to detracting from their linguistic distinctiveness, the reliance on translations of the tradition’s most important French
sources makes it more difficult to maintain their autonomy. 59
Legal education in mixed jurisdictions with a civil law presence
also plays an important role in preserving legal traditions and Quebec’s civilian tradition has remained distinct, in part, due to the legal
education offered in the province. 60 Jurists in Quebec must hold a
civil law degree, or its equivalent, in order to be eligible to write the
Quebec Bar exams and practice law in the province. Unlike some
57. This is only natural given that the majority of Quebeckers are francophone with 79.7% listing their mother tongue as French, and 87% of the population speaking French at home in 2011, see Statistics Canada, French and the francophonie in Canada—Language, 2011 Census of Population, 2 (2011),
https://perma.cc/4K55-7CVY.
58. There is, however, a recent translation of the Louisiana Civil Code making it available in French. See CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE ÉDITION BILINGUE (Olivier Moréteau ed., Société de législation comparée 2017). See also Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L.
STUD. 97 (2012).
59. For example, in Jersey, jurists are predominantly Anglophone but frequently cite the works of the French author Pothier, often relying on a translated
edition. See Timothy V.R. Hanson, Comparative Law in Action: the Jersey Law
of Contract, 16 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 194, 202 (2005) (“French has become a
foreign language in the Channel Islands, thereby making a perusal of the old
French texts that bit more onerous . . . .”); The Jersey Law Commission, Report:
The Law of Contract, 6 (2004) (“[T]he majority of Jersey residents are insufficiently fluent in French to be able to consider the relevant case law and text books
. . . .”). See also Roger K. Ward, The French Language in Louisiana Law and
Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L. REV. 1284 (1997) for a discussion of this
phenomenon in Louisiana.
60. William Tetley, Nationalism in a Mixed Jurisdiction and the Importance
of Language (South Africa, Israel, and Quebec/Canada), 78 TULSA L. REV. 175,
189 (2003-2004).
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other mixed jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, all Quebec law faculties offer civil law degree programs, even if some offer the possibility of also obtaining a common law degree if students opt to pursue
additional studies. 61 At McGill University, all students graduate
with both civil law and common law degrees, and its program,
which is built on an integrated, or transsystemic, study of both civil
and common law, offers a solid grounding in both legal traditions. 62
A very important factor in the survival of the civil law as a distinct legal tradition is Quebec’s Civil Code itself. Its successful
modernization and recodification in 1991 has contributed greatly to
the stature of the civilian tradition. The Civil Code of Quebec is not
merely a modernization of the laws contained in the previous Code,
the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which had been in place since 1866
and which had grown less coherent over time with the addition of
updates and amendments. 63 The new Code also reflects a modernized and distinctive view of Quebec’s civilian tradition, visible in its
“substance, language and symbolism.” 64 Both its tone and content
offer an image of Quebec law that John Brierley has called “selfsufficient,” presenting Quebec’s law as entirely autonomous from
external influence. 65 Brierley maintains that for this reason, the

61. For example, the Université de Montréal in Quebec and the University of
Ottawa in Ontario offer their civil law students the possibility of completing an
extra year and obtaining a common law degree. This is in contrast to, for instance,
Louisiana, where students typically receive a common law education with some
civil law courses in the curriculum and the option of obtaining a certificate in civil
law. See Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 51 (2012).
62. See Yves-Marie Morissette, McGill’s Integrated Civil and Common Law
Program, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 12, (2002). See generally Navigating the Transsystemic, 50 MCGILL L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2005).
63. Sophie Morin, Quebec: First Impressions Can Be Misleading, in A
STUDY OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS: ENDANGERED, ENTRENCHED OR BLENDED
165, 171 (Susan Farran, Esin Örücü, & Seán Patrick Donlan eds., Ashgate Publ’g
2014).
64. Brierley, supra note 53, at 484.
65. Brierley argues that the Code presents this image by breaking explicit ties
to the origins of its provisions that were derived from, or inspired by, other traditions or legal systems. Id. at 498-499.
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Code is in fact an expression of “the philosophy of Quebec as a distinct society,” and a declaration of Quebec’s legal sovereignty over
itself. 66 This legal nationalism complements the political nationalism present in the province of Quebec and underscores its recognition, by the rest of Canada, as a distinct society. 67
The new Code’s preservation of the civil law as a distinct and
autonomous tradition is reinforced by the inclusion of a Preliminary
Provision that proclaims the Code to be “the jus commune” of Quebec law and “the foundation of all other laws.” 68 Brierley remarks
that the Preliminary Provision indicates that the Code is “a reservoir
of fundamental juridical precepts and essential legal values,” which
makes it a valuable source not because it derives its authority from
any external or antecedent legal source, but because it is inherently
valuable. 69
The Preliminary Provision’s declaration that the Code is the
“foundation of all other laws” and the “jus commune” of Quebec is
entirely consistent with the approach advocated by proponents of the
diversification model. 70 In the opinion of Louisiana scholar Olivier
66. Id. at 496, 502.
67. See Adrian Popovici, Libres propos sur la culture juridique québécoise
dans un monde qui rétrécit, 54 MCGILL L.J. 223 (2009); Roderick A. Macdonald,
Reconceiving the Symbols of Property: Universalities, Interests and Other Heresies, 39 MCGILL L.J. 761, 810 (1994); Patrice Garant, Code civil du Québec, Code
de procédure civile et société distincte, 37 CAHIERS DE DROIT 1141 (1996).
68. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Preliminary Provision (Can.):
The Civil Code of Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human rights
and freedoms and the general principles of law, governs persons, relations between persons, and property. The Civil Code comprises a body
of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of its provisions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In these
matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws, although other laws
may complement the Code or make exceptions to it.
69. Brierley, supra note 53, at 500. See also H. Patrick Glenn, La Disposition
préliminaire du Code civil du Québec, le droit commun et les principes généraux
du droit, 46 CAHIERS DE DROIT 339 (2005).
70. See, e.g., Doré v. Verdun, supra note 48, paras. 15-16:
[T]he Civil Code is the jus commune of Quebec. Thus, unlike statute law
in the common law, the Civil Code is not a law of exception, and this
must be taken into account in interpreting it. It must be interpreted
broadly so as to favour its spirit over its letter and enable the purpose of
its provisions to be achieved. . . . [T]he Code is also the foundation of all
other laws dealing with matters to which the Code relates . . . .
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Moréteau, the Preliminary Provision has successfully “re-center[ed]
private law on the Civil Code” by reaffirming the Code’s primary
importance in the civilian tradition. 71 Moréteau views this approach
as all-important in a society in which there are numerous legal
sources that may compete with a code, and he has advocated for the
adoption of such a preliminary provision in other codes, specifically
Louisiana’s. 72
Finally, we cannot ignore the significance of the civilian judicial
presence on Canada’s final appellate court. With three of the nine
Supreme Court justices hailing from Quebec, “[t]he two legal traditions . . . continue to be living realities in the highest court of the
land.” 73 For all of these reasons, rather than being absorbed by the
common law as was once feared, the civilian tradition has continued
to thrive as a distinct and autonomous legal tradition in Canada.
VI. THE INSPIRATION MODEL
While the distinct nature of the civilian tradition is well accepted
today, we are currently witnessing a new trend, from one of staunch
diversification to one of inspiration. In recent years, we have begun
to see a greater willingness among judges to look to the other legal
tradition in their reasoning, with the result that comparative law between the two traditions has become a more important part of judicial methodology in Canada. Unlike the earlier unification model,
however, this trend is based on the premise that there is value in
looking across legal traditions, not to unify them but, rather, to borrow ideas from one to inform the other. The inspiration model is
perhaps most clearly articulated by Justice Stevenson as follows:
This Court has the benefit of being the final court of appeal
in a country that has two legal traditions: the English common law and the French civil law. Our two legal traditions
71. Moréteau, supra note 61, at 59.
72. Id.
73. Tetley, supra note 54, at 735. Tetley also notes the lack of any similar
tradition in the United States of having Louisiana judges on its Supreme Court.
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are independent and should not be confused. Concepts and
solutions found in one tradition should not be imposed on
the other tradition. But this does not mean that there is no
place for comparative law on this Court. 74
As this passage indicates, this new trend of inspiration maintains
the distinctiveness and integrity of the two legal traditions while, at
the same time, acknowledging the mutual influence they can have
on each other. It demonstrates that a comparative approach has the
potential to encourage the cross-fertilization of ideas between the
traditions while not detracting from the distinctive character of either. 75
There is, however, a legitimate concern that this use of comparative law may, in fact, cause a reversion to the nineteenth century
trend of unification, with all the potential dangers to the civilian tradition that this trend presented at the time. 76 While one must
acknowledge this as a serious potential danger, the inspiration trend
can, nonetheless, be seen as a positive movement provided it does
not repeat the mistakes of unification and builds upon the principles
developed by jurists who have insisted on the importance of diversification over the past century. An examination of recent cases
demonstrates that there are three major reasons these dangers are
indeed being mitigated.

74. Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992]
1 S.C.R. 1021, 1174 (Can.). See also Louis LeBel & Pierre-Louis Le Saunier,
L’interaction du droit civil et de la common law à la Cour suprême du Canada,
47 CAHIERS DE DROIT 179 (2006).
75. In White v. Central Trust Co. (1984), 7 D.L.R. 236, para. 27 (Can.), Supreme Court Justice LaForest J., as he then was, spoke of the judicial use of comparative law as a way to achieve “cross-fertilization.” This passage is cited in a
discussion of the growing use of comparative law in the Supreme Court of Canada
by another Supreme Court Justice, Gonthier J., see Gonthier, supra note 2, at 21.
76. Daniel Gardner, L'harmonisation des solutions en droit privé canadien :
regard sur quelques arrêts de la Cour suprême portant sur le droit civil at the 15e
Conférence Roger-Comtois at l’Université de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec (Apr.
27, 2017).
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A. The Use of “Caution” in Cross-Fertilization
Judges who look to the common law to inspire their civil law
decisions have insisted on using caution in this approach and have
established limitations on the application of the common law in
Quebec cases. First, there is a methodological limitation pursuant to
which judges acknowledge that civilian sources and methodology
are to be prioritized. 77 Secondly, there is a recognition that any residual role played by the common law will not apply where it would
contradict civil law sources, particularly the Code and the Quebec
Charter. 78 Finally, there is a translational limitation because today,
Quebec judges are mindful of the need to adapt or translate borrowed common law principles to fit within the particular context and
contours of Quebec civil law. 79 As a result, contemporary judges
have demonstrated that the common law can provide inspiration in
civilian cases when appropriate and when done in a manner consistent with the civil law tradition.
This cautious use of inspiration is evident in many judgments
written by Justice LeBel who, as previously explained, was an advocate of the diversification approach. However, notwithstanding
his general philosophy of prioritizing the civilian legal tradition, he
recognized the potential usefulness of looking to the common law.
As he stated in the 2010 Supreme Court decision of Globe and Mail,
“if the ultimate source of a legal rule is the common law, then it
would be only logical to resort to the common law, in the process of
interpreting and articulating that same rule in the civil law.” 80 He
therefore found it acceptable to look to a common law doctrine to
provide a framework for creating a journalist source privilege in
Quebec. He did likewise in Union Carbide by using the common

77. Lac d’Amiante du Québec Ltée v. 2858-0702 Québec Inc., [2001] 2
S.C.R. 743, paras. 37, 39 (Can.).
78. Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 41, para. 45
(Can.) [hereinafter Globe and Mail].
79. Baudouin, supra note 14, at 731.
80. Globe and Mail, supra note 78, para. 45.
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law as inspiration for the creation of a settlement privilege in Quebec civil law. 81 In both these cases, Justice LeBel looked to the common law to fill lacunae in Quebec law. This does not, however, indicate an endorsement of the wholesale importation of common law
principles since, as LeBel pointed out, “this [common law inspiration] is, of course, premised on the fact that the interpretation and
articulation of such a rule would not otherwise be contrary to the
overarching principles set out in the C.C.Q. and the Quebec Charter.” 82 Similarly, in a 2014 decision, LeBel examined the commonality requirement in class action authorizations in common law
cases, noting that the understanding of this common law framework
was helpful in order “to clarify the relevance and scope of the principles in question in the context of Quebec procedural law,” but
stressed that “caution must be exercised.” 83 This approach is not
limited to the Supreme Court, nor to Justice LeBel. In a recent Quebec Court of Appeal decision, for example, Justice Dutil noted that
even though a common law decision may not have any legal force
in the civilian tradition, its spirit may be applicable in Quebec civil
law as long as judges look to it with caution. 84
Even in cases where the Court has expressly emphasized the desirability of harmonization between the legal traditions, it is careful
to ensure that its judgments are consistent with civilian sources. For

81. Union Carbide Can. Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., [2014] 1 S.C.R. 800, paras.
27-37 (Can.).
82. Globe and Mail, supra note 78, para. 45.
83. Vivendi Can. Inc. v. Dell’Aniello, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 48 (Can.).
84. P.L. v. J.L., 2011 QCCA 1233, para. 36 (Can. Que.) (drawing inspiration
from the Supreme Court case M.(K.) v. M.(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, which established flexibility in the start date of prescription for incest cases in common law
jurisdictions) (as followed in Tremblay v. Lavoie, 2014 QCCS 3185, (Can. Que.)).
See also Struthers v. Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec, 2015
QCCS 5992, paras. 70-71 (Can. Que.) (where the Quebec Superior Court cites the
common law Supreme Court decision of Hyrniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, which
had interpreted the parameters of the motion for summary judgment, even though
that particular procedure is not available in Quebec. Nonetheless, the Court drew
inspiration from that case, justifying its decision to dismiss by citing the common
principle of proportionality in procedure as the basis of its decision).
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example, in the recent Jean Coutu decision, which concerned a request by contracting parties to have the court rectify their agreement,
the Supreme Court looked to the common law’s equitable doctrine
of rectification and declared that the harmonization of laws between
common law Canada and Quebec was “generally desirable.”85
Nonetheless, the decision itself, which refused rectification, is based
on an analysis of articles dealing with the interpretation of contracts
found in the Civil Code of Quebec and refers to a prior interpretation
of these codal articles in an earlier Supreme Court case from Quebec. 86 Similarly, in Caisse Populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant v.
Blouin, a decision dealing with security on property, the Supreme
Court noted that the decision had the benefit of “fostering a degree
of uniformity in this area, one that is crucial to the conduct of numerous business activities, while remaining faithful to the letter and
spirit of the Civil Code of Québec and the civil law origins of the
concept of pledge.” 87 These cases indicate that while the Court has,
of late, been willing to praise harmonization as a beneficial outcome
or consequence of certain rulings, it continues to look first and foremost to the civilian tradition’s sources and seeks to avoid importing
ideas that would be contrary to the civilian tradition.
B. Divergence Where Appropriate
While the courts have been willing to use the spirit of the common law to inform civilian cases in certain circumstances, it is important to note that they have also refused to do so in situations
where a divergent result was necessary to maintain the distinctive
character of Quebec law and culture. This idea was expressly invoked in the Supreme Court Reference, in which the Court’s interpretation given to the statute governing the appointment of Supreme
Court justices resulted in different rules for the appointment of
85. Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., supra note 43, para. 52.
86. Id. para. 25.
87. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant, supra note 44, para. 24 (emphasis added).
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judges from Quebec. In particular, the resulting interpretation meant
that while a judge of the Federal Court of Canada could be appointed
to fill one of the six non-Quebec seats on the Supreme Court, such
judge could not be appointed to fill one of the three Quebec seats.
The majority of the Supreme Court justified this difference by explaining that the wording of the statute was due to a historical compromise intended to “guarantee that a significant proportion of the
judges would be drawn from institutions linked to Quebec civil law
and culture,” and that the law must remain as such since, “the objective of ensuring representation from Quebec’s distinct juridical tradition remains no less compelling today.” 88
The same attitude towards the province’s distinct history and
culture was expressed in a 2013 case dealing with the constitutionality of certain aspects of Quebec’s marriage laws, in particular,
those governing spousal support and division of family assets for de
facto spouses. A de facto spouse challenged these provisions alleging that they contravened the equality provision in the Charter of
Human Rights and Freedoms because in Quebec, de facto spouses
were not entitled to claim spousal support or a division of family
assets, whereas their married counterparts in Quebec, and fellow de
facto spouses elsewhere in Canada, were so entitled. Here, Justice
LeBel provided a lengthy analysis of the historical and cultural
backdrop to marriage laws in the province stating that, “the entire
history of societal and legal changes that have led to the de facto
union becoming an accepted form of conjugality in Quebec . . . is
essential if we are to understand the constitutional issue before us
and consider it in its context.” 89 Chief Justice McLachlin, who also
endorsed the constitutionality of these laws, argued that while they
were vastly divergent from the laws in other provinces, they were
88. Supreme Court Act, 2014, supra note 46, para. 93.
89. Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5, para. 262 (Can.). In upholding the constitutionality of these laws, Justice LeBel wrote on behalf of four
of the nine Supreme Court justices. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote a decision
concurring in the result and thus, this outcome was endorsed by the majority of
the Supreme Court.
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part of a “policy goal [that] is important to Quebec,” stating that “the
fact that Quebec has chosen a different policy than other provinces
in keeping with its own history and social values does not make the
law unconstitutional.” 90
These cases indicate both an awareness of Quebec’s legal and
historical distinctiveness and a conscious desire not to undermine it,
even if this results in a significant difference between Quebec law
and the law in the rest of Canada. Thus, even while the Court moves
towards a greater use of comparative law, and even lauds the harmonization of law across Canada, it remains resistant to such approaches in situations where the distinctiveness of Quebec’s legal
situation is at the core of the issue in question.
C. Reciprocity in Cross-Fertilization of Ideas
Perhaps one of the clearest signs that a new trend is emerging is
that we are now seeing reciprocity in the use of comparative law.
There are an increasing number of common law decisions that make
reference to, and are inspired by, Quebec civil law. The Supreme
Court failed to use the civil law as inspiration in common law decisions even once during the nineteenth century unification period. 91
This is in contrast to today’s inspiration trend, which is a bilateral
movement where the traditions serve as mutual influences on each
other rather than as a tool to impose one tradition on the other. Two
recent Supreme Court decisions are notable examples of this. In a
2012 decision on appeal from the common law province of Ontario,
the Court sought to clarify the “real and substantial connection” test
for determining court jurisdiction in the private international law
context. Justice LeBel, writing for the Court, rejected wide judicial
discretion in favour of the creation of an appropriate framework to
establish such connection based on “a set of relevant presumptive

90. Id. para. 415.
91. Baudouin, supra note 14, at 719.
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connecting factors,” an approach that mirrored the regime established in the Civil Code of Quebec. 92 In order to develop this new
approach, LeBel relied heavily on codal articles and discussed their
interpretation in Quebec case law throughout the decision. 93 This
examination of the civil law clearly inspired the development of a
new approach applicable in a common law jurisdiction.
The second notable example is the 2014 case of Bhasin v.
Hrynew, a decision that expanded the principle of good faith in contract performance in Canadian common law, elevating it to the status
of a general organizing principle. 94 While the robustness of the common law duty of good faith created by the Supreme Court falls short
of its broad and encompassing counterpart that has been developed
in Quebec law, the decision is noteworthy given the historic reluctance of the common law to recognize such a duty at all. In creating
what Justice Cromwell called an “incremental advance” 95 in this
area of law, he found “comfort” 96 in the Quebec experience, where
a legally imposed duty of good faith has not “impeded contractual
activity or contractual stability.” 97
One finds common law cases relying on the civil law for inspiration in lower court decisions as well. For example, the reasoning
in Opron Construction Co. v. Alberta, a first instance decision from
the common law province of Alberta, drew heavily on an earlier Supreme Court decision emanating from Quebec, Bank of Montreal v.
Bail Ltée. 98 The Bail decision had been based on the civilian principle of good faith in the formation of contracts, which creates a precontractual duty of disclosure, a principle that does not explicitly
exist in the common law. Nonetheless, the Alberta court found that

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, para. 78 (Can.).
E.g., id. paras. 107-108.
Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 (Can.).
Id. para. 29.
Id. para. 82.
Id. para. 85.
Opron Construction Co., supra note 4, paras. 536-547.
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there had been a failure to make adequate disclosure in the defendant’s invitation to tender and that this failure amounted to misrepresentation. It justified its use of the civilian decision as inspiration by
pointing to the behaviour of the Supreme Court itself, noting that the
Court “has recently emphasized the benefits of a comparative law
approach between the two legal systems in Canada.” 99 The Alberta
Court found that the examination of the civilian case, the history of
good faith in Quebec, and the articles of the Civil Code were informative since, “while the [Bail] decision is based upon the Civil
Code of Lower Canada, its reasoning finds common ground in the
common law.” 100
Common law cases relying on the civil law for inspiration are
not as prevalent as those where the inspiration moves in the other
direction. One reason is that the majority of Quebec civilian decisions, at the first instance and appellate levels, are drafted in French,
making them less accessible to common law jurists from other regions of the country who may be less comfortable with French decisions than are their Quebec counterparts with decisions drafted by
common law judges in English. The exception to this is Supreme
Court decisions, which are published simultaneously in both official
languages, and therefore it is not surprising that most of the civilian
decisions being relied upon by common law judges are those from
the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, we are witnessing an increasing willingness on the
part of common law judges to reach out to the civil law for inspiration. Moreover, in cases where this is done, the common law courts
do not simply adopt the approach taken in the civil law. Rather than
transplanting the civilian principles in their entirety into common
law decisions, the courts use these principles as sources of inspiration that help “nourish the [applicable] common law principles.” 101

99. Id.
100. Id. para. 537.
101. Id. para. 598.
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This represents a parallel with the civilian cases that use the common law for inspiration, indicating that jurists in both traditions feel
there is educational value in looking across traditions, while acknowledging that each tradition should, ultimately, remain governed
by its own framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented three major trends that exemplify the
interrelationship between Quebec civil law and Canadian common
law. The initial trend of unification of the late nineteenth century
had the benefit of creating consistency in the laws across the country, but it carried a serious risk of emasculating the Quebec civilian
tradition. The opposite trend of diversification that emerged in the
early twentieth century had the advantage of preserving and protecting the autonomy of the civilian legal tradition, but carried with it
the risk of creating a narrow-minded and parochial vision of legal
interpretation and development.
The new inspiration trend, identified in this paper, also has advantages and risks. Its polyjural approach has the benefit of creating
a rich cross-fertilization of ideas through the “encounter between legal traditions” 102 and “horizontal transjudicial communication.”103
This has allowed both traditions to borrow and learn from the other
in order to shape new legal principles. Of course, while we may recognize the positive effects of such an enlightened approach to judicial methodology, we must always be alert to the risk of reverting
back to the philosophy of unification. But as long as jurists are attuned to this risk, and due regard is paid to maintaining the distinctiveness and integrity of Canada’s civil and common law traditions,
a sophisticated and careful comparative approach can yield positive

102. Nicholas Kasirer, Legal Education as Métissage, 78 TULSA L. REV. 481,
482 (2003).
103. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29
U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 104 (1994).
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results through the mutual influence that legal traditions may have
on each other.

